Archive for the ‘school finance’ Category

Self-governance

Thursday, December 10th, 2009

Locality is crucial for accountability. Because the greater is the distance between the policy maker or the policy making body and those most affected by the policy, the students, teachers and schools, the more adverse is the policy’s impact on a public school district’s finances and ultimately upon the quality of education it provides. Our public schools, therefore, must be given the choice of becoming self-governing, self-funding, autonomous, local public school districts free from state and federal mandates so that they can be liberated to provide a top quality education while held being accountable to this standard by those who are the most capable of doing so, the local school district’s taxpayers.

A self-governing public school district would be free of state and federal mandates but would abide by all other state and federal laws. It would remain a public school district rather than become a charter school. It would continue to serve the same local community with the same regular and special education students. While public school districts could elect to stay within the state system and continue to abide by all mandates, all districts would be given the opportunity to legally opt out.

Self-governance is the alternative to a state dominated educational system that could provide public schools with the authority necessary to improve educational accountability consistent with the priorities of their local school communities. It would also provide school districts with the flexibility to innovate rather than be forced to march in lock step to the state’s one-size-fits-all mandates which fit no district. Because decisions guiding the operations of self-governing schools would no longer be determined at the state level, parents, teachers, school administrators, boards of education and local taxpayers would be better able to shape the quality of education which students receive in their local schools.

Self-governance would eliminate the excessive financial and administrative burdens imposed by state mandates. The ever increasing cost of the state’s unfunded and under funded mandates is forcing school districts not only to cut non-mandate protected education programs but also to increase property taxes. For example, New Jersey’s public school districts can no longer afford to pay for these unfunded and under funded mandates because most school districts are forced to spend disproportionately more to meet the requirements of these mandates than these districts receive in total state and federal financial aid. Self-governance would increase the financial resources available for the classroom because the funds that are currently used for compliance with state mandates could be redirected to improving student learning and achievement, which after all is the real mission of our schools.

How do we restructure our educational system such that we not only enable our schools to increase the property taxpayers’ return on their investment but also greatly improve the quality of education while holding schools accountable to this standard? The answer is to give our public schools the choice of becoming self-governing, self-funding, autonomous local public school districts free from state and federal mandates. This would empower public schools to improve the quality of education consistent with the priorities of their local communities as well as the flexibility to innovate. Legally opting out of the state system through a state-wide voter approved referendum would restore decision-making to the local school district level. Because decisions guiding the operations of self-governing schools would no longer be made largely at the state level, parents, teachers, school administrators, boards of education and local taxpayers would be better able not only to shape the quality of education provided in their local schools but also to hold their local schools accountable for this outcome.

Tags:school governance, self-governing school districts
Posted in decision making, deregulation of schools, disaggregation, education, educational leadership, home rule, local schools, New Jersey, property taxes, property values, public education, public finance, school finance, school funding, school governance, school law, school reform, self-funding school districts, self-governance, state financial aid, state mandates | No Comments »

The Tieboutian Choice

Saturday, December 5th, 2009

Tiebout’s (1956) conceptual breakthrough was that taxpayers are mobile and as a result will choose the municipality that best meets their needs by moving to that location. His model successfully addressed the free rider problem that plagues governmental entities providing public goods and services such as public education. Indeed, taxpayers seem to decide where to live based largely on the quality of the local school district.

According to Tiebout (1956,) taxpayers reveal their preferences for their desired level of public goods and services by the decision they make concerning where they choose to live. Through such a decision making process (Baker, Green and Richards, 2008,) Tiebout’s model “could lead to an optimal allocation of public services where no one person in the system could be made better off without making someone else worse off.” According to Tiebout (1956,) “The greater the number of communities and the greater the variance among them, the closer the consumer will come to fully realizing his preference position.”

Tiebout (1956) concluded that a taxpayer’s choice of municipalities and, therefore, school districts, reflects a private sector competitive market model. In discussing this model for school choice, Baker, Green and Richards (2008) report “Tiebout proposes that local, rather than centralized, government financing of public services could result in a form of competitive marketplace that would yield more optimal pricing of public goods through local tax policy and more appropriate alignment of consumer preferences and the quality of public goods.” Tiebout (1956) explains this difference, “At the central level the preferences of the consumer-voter are given, and the government tries to adjust to the pattern of these preferences, whereas at the local level various governments have their revenue and expenditure patterns more or less set.” Taxpayers, therefore, will choose the district that best meets their needs when choosing among school districts of varying levels of educational quality.

Today, the Tieboutian choice is manifested in the difference between local funding versus state or federal funding and the corresponding state or federal control that comes along with it. The fundamental problem with centralized funding, whether state or federal is that it leads to a one-size-fits-all approach for education but one that fits no district. Baker, Green and Richards (2008) explain, “The local property tax empowers local voters to express what they want for their local public schools.” But “when property taxes become statewide taxes, the political advantages of empowering local citizens and promoting competition and sorting among jurisdictions is lost.” This mass standardization of policy often leads to state and federal funding guidelines that are incongruous with the needs and priorities of local school districts.

The specific needs of individual school districts vary to such a large degree that they render uniform state and federal policy formulas inadequate. Instead, public school districts need a mass customization of educational funding, control and policy that can only derive from local funding and governance. Oates (1972) supports the notion that public education should be provided at the lowest level. Kenny (1982) also argues for the provision of public education by local school districts. Because there is no reliable connection between state and federal policy makers and the local provision of education, accountability requires local decision making.

A reduction in local school district control over the levying and allocating of property taxes decreases accountability and adversely affects public school quality. Because reductions of property tax revenues whether through state imposed limitations or via the substitution of state or federal funds reduces the level of local investment in the school district, the stake held by local taxpayers is similarly reduced. Fischel (2001) explains this using taxpayers without children in the public schools, “At the local level, they are willing to support, or at least not oppose, high levels of spending because better schools add to the value of their homes. At the state level, voters without children do not perceive such an offsetting benefit to their taxes.” Having a lowered sense of ownership in their schools, taxpayers become more complacent as the proportion of state and federal funding increases. This causes a corresponding reduction in the level of accountability required by the stakeholders and the quality of their public schools’ education declines as a result.

Fischel (2001) explains that taxpayers resemble investors as they want their major asset, their home, to appreciate in value. Home owners have a vested interest in the success of their local schools because the credit rating of a school district’s host municipality is largely dependent on the financial soundness and credit worthiness of its schools. Indeed, the higher is a municipality’s credit rating the lower is its debt service expense.

Taxpayers hold local schools accountable not just to improve the quality of education but more importantly to offset risks to their property’s value which can not be easily diversified. The more accountability a local school district provides, the more local taxpayers support the public funding of public education. Local school districts, therefore, will efficiently provide public education as a result of taxpayers’ exercising their Tieboutian choice.

References

Baker, B. D., Green, P., & Richards, C. E. (2008). Financing Education Systems, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc.

Fischel, W., (2001) The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influence Local Government Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use Policies, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Kenny, L. W., (1982) Economies of scale in schooling, Economics of Education Review, 2:1-24.

Oates, W. E., (1972) Fiscal Federalism, New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.

Tiebout, C. M., (1956) A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, The Journal of Political Economy, 64, 416-424.

Posted in Bruce Baker, Capitalization of property taxes, Capitalization of school district quality, Charles Tiebout, homeownership, local property taxes, local schools, New Jersey Property taxes, property taxes, property values, public education, public finance, school finance, school funding, school governance, Wallace Oates, William Fischel | No Comments »

The Capitalization of Local School District Quality

Saturday, December 5th, 2009

The benefits that taxpayers derive form their local school district quality and property taxes are capitalized in their property values. Because taxpayers strive to protect and improve their property values, they constantly evaluate the quality of their school district so as to maximize their property values. If their school district’s quality deteriorates or is expected to decline, typical Tieboutian taxpayers will “vote with their feet.”

By voting with their feet taxpayers choose the local school district that best meets their needs and one that will contribute to their property values. But taxpayers vote not only with their feet but also on school district operating budgets, capital projects and board of education members. Through the exercise of these votes, taxpayers control the quality of education provided by their local schools as well as the level of property taxes levied. Their collective decisions lead to a Pareto efficient allocation of local public education. In this context, Baker, Green and Richards (2008) state that the “Tiebout model represents the most basic form of school choice.”

But states tend to make educational policies especially school finance regulations that are too uniform for the wide variety of school districts with their wide disparities in needs and priorities. It is decentralized or local control rather than centralized or state control over public education, therefore, that causes, supports and sustains the efficient allocation of a school district’s financial and human resources. Local control leads to the provision of the maximum level of educational quality and accountability.

California exemplifies the downside of state control. Fishel (2001) argues that the Serrano v. Priest ruling destroyed the connection among local control, property taxes and school district quality because California taxpayers essentially lost their ability to hold local school districts accountable. Furthermore, Fishel (2001) contends that the Serrano decision not only lead to the passage of Proposition 13 but also to the centralization of school finance in California. The adverse impact on local school districts of California’s centralization of school finance has never been as clear as it is today while the state faces bankruptcy. Because the state forced local school districts to be overly dependent on unsustainable state funding, the state’s fiscal crisis has brought many districts to the brink of financial collapse.

Tiebout (1956) argues that because crowding and congestion affect the provision of public goods and services, it is inefficient to provide public education at a centralized level whether state or federal. Public education is more efficiently provided at the local level. Fischel (2001) agrees with his assessment of school finance in California in which taxpayers lost control over local schools and property taxes which led to reduced levels of taxpayer involvement in and support for public education. Fischel (2001) concludes “the apparent quality of public education has declined nationwide as the states’ share of funding for it has risen.” It is essential that taxpayers have control over their local schools so they will be motivated to properly fund, support and improve public education.

References

Baker, B. D., Green, P., & Richards, C. E. (2008). Financing Education Systems, Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Pearson Education, Inc.

Fischel, W., (2001) The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influence Local Government Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use Policies, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Tiebout, C. M., (1956) A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, The Journal of Political Economy, 64, 416-424.

Posted in Bruce Baker, Bruce Cooper, Capitalization of property taxes, Capitalization of school district quality, Charles Tiebout, home values, homeownership, local property taxes, local schools, New Jersey Property taxes, property taxes, property values, public finance, school finance, school funding, William Fischel | No Comments »

The Property Tax Burden of County Government in New Jersey

Friday, October 9th, 2009

In these challenging economic times, every home owner wants to make sure their property taxes are as low as possible and are put to use where they can do the most good. Nowhere is this more necessary than in New Jersey, where it is imperative that all levels of government do not waste our scarce financial resources and cut taxes particularly property taxes.

Perhaps the most effective way to cut property taxes in New Jersey is to eliminate the tax burden imposed by county government. The three New Jersey counties of Union, Essex and Bergen together levy approximately $1.7 billion in annual property taxes. While states such as Connecticut eliminated county government in the 1960’s and, therefore, its home owners are free of county property taxes, all 21 of New Jersey’s counties combine to collect approximately $6.0 billion in property taxes annually.

Union County, for example, spends approximately $450 million annually, of which the City of Summit pays $26.4 million in property taxes or approximately 24% of every property tax dollar in Summit. But the City of Summit receives less than ten cents for every dollar of County services in return. In addition, the County percentage is artificially low because the Freeholders took another pension payment holiday. While almost all of Summit’s property tax payment to Union County is redistributed to other towns within the county, the property tax dollars for Summit’s schools stay in Summit and help to support local property values. If we can significantly reduce or ultimately eliminate county government to significantly lower our property tax burden, then the value of every New Jersey home owner’s principal asset, his/her home, will rise correspondingly.

New Jersey taxpayers must be vigilant in regard to any potential risks to their homes and businesses such as the unnecessary tax burden of county government and the degradation of the quality of education in their local schools. In addition, the credit rating of every municipal government depends largely upon the quality and financial soundness of its local schools. Therefore, significant risks to the quality and funding of a municipality’s local public schools or its disproportionately high level of county property taxes would most likely adversely impact its credit rating and increase its debt service expense as a result. Taxpayers must work together to counteract these risks because these risks can not be diversified.

Posted in accountability, assessment of property, county government, County Property taxes, education, local property taxes, local schools, mandates, New Jersey Property taxes, property taxes, public finance, school finance, school funding, school governance | No Comments »

The Charter School Advantage: Operating as a Deregulated Autonomous Public School

Sunday, June 28th, 2009

The proponents of charter schools (Newman, 1998) purport that charter schools are the answer to what ails our public school system. The rationale supporting how charter schools can provide an education that is superior in quality to that offered by conventional public schools is that they are deregulated autonomous public schools that are granted extreme freedom in how they choose to innovate, experiment, manage operations, “respond to their customers”, govern themselves and enroll as well as educate their students (Sugarman, 2002). “In return for this autonomy, charter schools usually are asked to demonstrate academic outcome results for their children, but that too is supposed to be measured without too much interference with the school’s independence” (Kemerer, 1999, cited in Sugarman, 2002). The core elements of a charter school’s success are its ability to function with autonomy and deregulation, both of which are regularly denied to conventional public schools. The solution to what ails our public school system, therefore, is to enable our traditional public schools to operate with the same degree of autonomy and deregulation as that granted to charter schools.

Charter schools are public schools that are funded primarily by local property taxes but are granted freedom from many state and federal mandates and restrictions so that they can provide innovative and cutting-edge teaching and learning. As a result, charter schools function independently from their host district’s board of education under a charter granted by the state (New Jersey Department of Education, 2001). According to the New Jersey Department of Education, as soon as the charter is approved by the Commissioner of Education, the school is governed by a board of trustees authorized by the State Board of Education and the charter school is thereby granted all the necessary powers to execute and implement its charter.

By agreeing to the contract with the state, a charter school receives public funding with significantly less regulation but it is also expected to provide a quality of education that exceeds that of a conventional public school. But despite their public school charter and property tax funding, charter schools operate independently of their local taxpayers’ input, feedback and control. “While charter schools emphasize that they are a new form of public schools, they are increasingly appearing and behaving like private schools” (Horn and Miron, 2000, cited in Bracey, 2002).

According to the New Jersey Department of Education, however, a charter school “must outline how the school will meet the New Jersey Core Curriculum Content Standards” and “Cross-Content Workplace Readiness Skills” plus all “teachers, administrators, and professional staff must have New Jersey State certification” (New Jersey Department of Education, 2005, cited in Bredehoft, 2005). While charter schools operate independently, the local board of education “must also provide transportation for charter school students residing in its district under the same terms and conditions for district students attending public schools” (Bredehoft, 2005). Also, “a charter school may operate within a ‘region of residence’, comprised of a district or multiple districts identified in the charter school’s application, and must have a physical residence in one of those districts” (New Jersey Department of Education, 2005, cited in Bredehoft, 2005).

A charter school is funded based on its enrollment primarily by the revenues it receives through its local board of education. According to the New Jersey Department of Education, the host district’s board of education must pay the charter school ninety percent of its average per pupil share of the annual operating budget for the specific grade level of each student (Bredehoft, 2005). Although charter schools can not charge tuition, they are eligible to receive federal and state funds. As a result, it seems as if funding is siphoned from the host public school district to the charter school without the direct or indirect approval of local taxpayers.

Because local property taxes as well as state and federal financial aid abide by a zero-sum process, all funds transferred from a conventional public school to a charter school result in a cut in funding that can not be recouped. A conventional public school must cut non-mandate protected programs and services such as regular education in order to make up for the lost revenues. In addition, because state and federal governments either under fund or do not fund their mandates, conventional public schools are forced to pay for these shortfalls while charter schools are often not subject to the same regulations or to the same extent as their host district.

Charter schools enjoy many other advantages over their conventional counterparts. Charter schools can limit their enrollment which enables them to have lower student-teacher ratios and forces conventional public schools to educate the majority of students in comparatively larger class sizes. Charter schools do not have to enroll students after the beginning of the school year which enables them to have much more stable enrollments than conventional public schools. The scarcity of unions and tenure in charter schools also represents another set of cost advantages.

The extent to which charter schools can limit the number of students who qualify for special education, are from low-income or poverty level families, or are English language learners (Levay, 2009) would force traditional public schools to educate a disproportionate number of these needy and at-risk students who are much more expensive to educate. Such a practice would minimize costs for the charter school in the district while it would correspondingly increase the public school district’s expenses. In discussing his study of Michigan’s charter schools Bracey (2002) concludes “And, perhaps most significant, the student bodies look more and more like private schools: Fewer minority and special needs students are enrolled.”

Unlike charter schools that can cap or otherwise more effectively limit their enrollment and, thereby, limit the cost of their raw materials, traditional public schools have to enroll all of the students in the district who wish to attend and, therefore, can not control the cost of their raw materials. This cost advantage in favor of charter schools is highlighted below in the “blueberry epiphany” (Cuban, 2004) experienced by former CEO, Mr. Jamie Vollmer, because as the woman from the audience responds to Mr. Vollmer “… we can never send back our blueberries. We take them all!” and, thus, traditional public schools can not control the quality of their raw materials.

“If I ran my business the way you people operate your schools, I wouldn’t be in business very long!” I stood before an audience filled with outraged teachers who were becoming angrier by the minute. My speech had entirely consumed their precious 90 minutes of in-service training. Their initial icy glares had turned to restless agitation. You could cut the hostility with a knife.

I represented a group of business people dedicated to improving public schools. I was an executive at an ice cream company that became famous in the 1980’s when People magazine chose its blueberry flavor as the “Best Ice Cream in America.”

I was convinced of two things. First, public schools needed to change; they were archaic selecting and sorting mechanisms designed for the Industrial Age and out of step with the needs of our emerging “knowledge society.” Second, educators were a major part of the problem: they resisted change, hunkered down in their feathered nests, protected by tenure and shielded by a bureaucratic monopoly. They needed to look to business. We knew how to produce quality. Zero defects! Total quality management! Continuous improvement!

In retrospect, the speech was perfectly balanced—equal parts ignorance and arrogance. As soon as I finished, a woman’s hand shot up … She began quietly. “We are told sir, that you manage a company that makes good ice cream.” I smugly replied, “Best ice cream in America, ma’am.” “How nice,” she said. “Is it rich and smooth?” “Sixteen percent butterfat,” I crowed. “Premium ingredients?” she inquired. “Super premium! Nothing but triple-A.” I was on a roll. I never saw the next line coming.

“Mr. Vollmer,” she said, leaning forward with a wicked eyebrow raised to the sky, “when you are standing on your receiving dock and you see an inferior shipment of blueberries arrive, what do you do?” In the silence of that room, I could hear the trap snap. I knew I was dead meat, but I wasn’t going to lie. “I send them back.”

“That’s right!” she barked, “and we can never send back our blueberries. We take them big, small, rich, poor, gifted, exceptional, abused, frightened, confident, homeless, rude, and brilliant. We take them with attention deficit disorder, junior rheumatoid arthritis, and English as their second language. We take them all! Every one! And that, Mr. Vollmer, is why it’s not a business, it’s a school!” In an explosion, all 290 teachers, principals, bus drivers, aids, custodians, and secretaries jumped to their feet and yelled, “Yeah! Blueberries! Blueberries!”

And so began my long transformation. Since then, I have learned that a school is not a business. Schools are unable to control the quality of their raw material, they are dependent upon the vagaries of politics for a reliable revenue stream, and they are constantly mauled by a howling horde of disparate, completing customer groups that would send the best CEO screaming into the night” (pp. 3-4).

Charter schools enroll students who would otherwise attend the local public schools thereby forcing traditional public school districts to cut educational programs and services correspondingly. But if a traditional school district lost a disproportionate number of students and terminated a proportionate number of teachers and aids, it would not be able to make up many of the operating expenses associated with those students who left to attend the local charter school. Charter schools, therefore, may seem to provide a higher quality of education than conventional public schools but only as a result of the revenue and cost advantages built into their charters.

Because the majority of state and federal financial aid is in some way related to enrollment levels, a public school district would stand to lose aid in direct proportion to the reduction in its enrollment caused by charter schools. This would force cuts to non-mandate protected programs such as regular education. The double whammy of reduced state and federal financial aid as well as forced cuts to regular education would be especially distressful for public school districts. Therefore, having local property taxes finance charter schools siphons away crucial revenues from traditional public schools.

The proponents of charter schools espouse their competition with traditional public schools as helping to improve the quality of public education. But charter schools serve only a fraction of the school community while diverting scarce funds from their host local school districts that educate the overwhelming majority of students. This unequal playing field levels down the quality of public education.

To date, the general public largely seems to have not fully understood that charter schools are neither traditional public schools nor the extent to which charter schools are publicly funded but without local taxpayer control. While such a misunderstanding might have resulted from the lack of resonance of charter schools on the general public’s radar screen, surely it will evaporate rapidly as President Obama and U. S. Secretary of Education, Arne Duncan, actively promote the development and expansion of charter schools nationwide (Maxwell, 2009). Once the public becomes more aware of the real definition of charter schools and the extent to which they are funded with local property taxes, there will most likely be many questions raised.

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References

Bracey, G. W. (2002). The War Against America’s Public Schools: Privatizing Schools, Commercializing Education, Boston: Allyn and Bacon.

Bredehoft, J. M. (2005). New Jersey Charter Schools: History and Information, New Jersey Community Capital, 1(1), Retrieved from http://www.newjerseycommunitycapital.org.

Cuban, L. (2004). The Blackboard and the Bottom Line: Why Schools Can’t Be Businesses, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press.

Horn, J. and Miron, G. (2000). An Evaluation of the Michigan Charter School Initiative: Performance, Accountability, and Impact, Kalamazoo: The Evaluation Center, Western Michigan University.

Kemerer, F. R. (1999) School Choice Accountability in School Choice and Social Controversy, Sugarman, S. D. and Kemerer, F. R. (Editors), (174-211). Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution Press.

Levay, W. J. (2009). Put the Public Back in “Public Charter School”, Edwise, Retrieved from http://www.edwize.org.

Maxwell, L. A. (2009). Obama’s Team Advocacy Boosts Charter Movement, Education Week, 28(35), 1, 24-25.

New Jersey Department of Education (2001). Charter School Evaluation Report, Retrieved from http://www.state.nj.us.

New Jersey Department of Education (2005). New Jersey Charter School Application 2005, Retrieved from http://www.nj.gov.

Newman, M. (1998). New Jersey Rejects Challenge to Charter School Program, The New York Times, April 2, 1998.

Sugarman, S. D. (2002). Charter School Funding Issues, Education Policy Analysis Archives, 10(34). Retrieved from http://www.epaa.asu.edu/epaa/v10n34.

Posted in academic outcomes, academic performance, Arne Duncan, at-risk students, autonomy of schools, board of education, cap on enrollment, charter, charter school application, charter schools, class size, contract, deregulation of schools, double whammy, education, educational leadership, ELL, English language learners, enrollment, experimentation, federal financial aid, IDEA, innovation, local property taxes, local schools, mandates, Michigan, minority students, needy students, New Jersey, New Jersey Commissioner of Education, New Jersey Core Curriculum Content Standards (CCCS), New Jersey Department of Education, New Jersey State certification, non-mandate protected programs, per pupil budget, per pupil spending, President Obama, property taxes, public finance, region of residence, regular education, school finance, school funding, school governance, school law, school performance, school reform, special education, State Board of Education, state financial aid, state mandates, student performance, student teacher ratios, tenure, tuition, U. S. Secretary of Education, unequal playing field, unions | No Comments »

Local School Districts mean Better Education

Tuesday, April 7th, 2009

Is bigger really better? This is the crucial question facing New Jersey’s schools as the state moves toward a consolidated county-wide school district framework. The proposed consolidation would eliminate local school district administrative personnel and centralize the operation of each of the county’s schools within one county-wide district such as the model used in Maryland (Enlighten-New Jersey, 2006). As a result, all decisions concerning local school functions would be made at the county level with little local recourse.

While consolidation may sound tempting, because it is based on a presumption of economies-of-scale leading to assumed lower operating costs as well as improved administrative efficiencies which, in turn, are expected to result in lower property taxes plus greater parental engagement, the reality is much different, however. It has been shown that county-wide districts often result in increased costs, increased bureaucracy, students being so remote that parents are less engaged, and increased special interest group control of the agenda, curriculum as well as the distribution of funds (Wenders, 2005).

County-wide school districts tend to expand the county departments of education into unwieldy bureaucracies (Wenders, 2005). These bureaucracies often become so large that their administrative costs exceed the combined cost of the local administrative personnel, including but not limited to superintendents, business administrators and directors of special education, they are supposed to replace. Moreover, because these county departments of education are staffed largely by political appointees, they tend to operate without the essential public feedback that is the backbone of local boards of education.

At the outset, New Jersey’s legislators used Maryland’s experience (School Board Notes, 2006) as a benchmark for the expected savings and efficiencies for New Jersey’s consolidation. However, during her testimony to a panel of New Jersey state senators, Ms. Marie S. Bilik (2008), Executive Director of the New Jersey School Boards Association, demonstrated that the total state-wide administrative costs of the Maryland school system exceed those of New Jersey’s. While testifying in front of the New Jersey Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee on March 20, 2008, Ms. Bilik referenced an U.S. Department of Education report (2006), “A recent report by the U.S. Department of Education ranks New Jersey 38^th among the states and District of Columbia in the percentage of current expenditures devoted to administration. That means 37 other states – including Maryland and Pennsylvania – spend more on administration than New Jersey.” In addition, enrollment in New Jersey’s public schools was over fifty percent greater than that of Maryland during the same period and continues to exceed Maryland’s enrollment by similar margins. Thus, rather than removing administrative costs, the Maryland model has actually added costs and administrative overhead (Bilik, 2008).

While New Jersey has not yet moved to a complete county-wide model, its recent school consolidation legislation has significantly increased the power of the politically appointed Executive County Superintendent. Among these expanded powers is the ability to compel the creation or expansion of regional school districts with the ultimate goal of consolidating the regionalized districts into one county-wide school district in every county. New Jersey’s county-wide school districts would be run by Executive County Superintendents, political appointees, who would not be accountable to the voters but rather would serve at the discretion of partisan political forces.

But consolidation of local school districts into county level districts also tends to result in more of a traditional military-type command-and-control decision making process rather than a process controlled by local school districts with the active participation of local constituencies most notably local parents. In a command-and-control model, while the state and federal policy makers develop the overall strategy for policy implementation (Fusarelli and Cooper, 2009), it is the county-wide school districts that combine these policies with their political directives to determine the curriculum, priorities and budget for each school. However, because the county level is too distant from where education actually takes place and is more easily influenced by special interest groups, the result is often less parental engagement.

Concentrating the school system at the local district level rather than at the county level will not only enable more resources to be focused on those most affected by education, the students, but also enable those most intimately involved in providing education, the teachers, to provide better instruction. But the rise of county departments of education will also cause the local school districts to spend less time on students as well as parents because more time will be required to be spent on bureaucratic obligations thereby decreasing parental engagement which is a key component in improving student performance. It is the local districts that not only are closest to the students but also have the necessary local expertise to most effectively decide how to provide a quality education.

Indeed, it seems as if the reason for preventing or eliminating county-wide school districts is embodied in the landmark Brown v. Board of Education case. In Brown v. Board of Education, the Supreme Court not only ruled against school racial segregation by striking down the practice of separate but equal but also established the right of all students to attend their neighborhood school. Consistent with this ruling, it is essential that every child be able to attend their neighborhood school within a local school district free from the burden of county level bureaucracies so that the schools are better able to concentrate on improving every student’s performance.

Consolidating local school districts into larger county-wide districts removes decision making authority from those most affected by educational policy decisions: the individual student as well as his/her parents, school and district. It also concentrates policy formulation and decision making at a centralized level where special interest groups have greater leverage on the policy makers and, as a result, greater control of the policy outcomes including local school budgets. Moreover, consolidation of local school districts into county level districts while fewer in number tends to result in higher state-wide total administrative costs due to the lack of accountability, more political patronage and reduced local parental input.

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References

Bilik, M. S. (2008). Testimony: FY09 State Budget, Senate Budget and Appropriations Committee, Senate Annex, Committee Room 4, Trenton, New Jersey, March 20, 2008.

Enlighten-New Jersey, (2006). Is School Consolidation The Answer To New Jersey’s Property Tax Crisis? August 9, 2006, Retrieved from http://www.enlightennj.com.

Fusarelli, B. C. and Cooper, B. S., (2009). The Rising State: How State Power Is Transforming Our Nation’s Schools, State University of New York Press, Albany.

School Board Notes, (2006) New Jersey vs. Maryland: The Facts, September 14, 2006, Retrieved from http://www.njsba.org Trenton, New Jersey: New Jersey School Boards Association.

U. S. Department of Education, National Center for Education Statistics (2006). Common Core of Data, August, 2006.

Wenders, J. T., (2005) Deconsolidate Oregon’s School Districts March 21, 2005, Retrieved from http://www.cascadepolicyinstitute.org.

Tags:Add new tag, Brown v. Board of Education, county government, county wide school districts, education, education mandates, educational policies, executive county superintendent, home rule, local school district, Marie S. Bilik, Maryland county school district model, neighborhood school, neighborhood schools, New Jersey, Oregon, Pennsylvania, property taxes, regional school districts, school administrative costs, school consolidation, school district consolidation, school district merger, school finance, school racial segregation, walk to school
Posted in bigger is not better, county government, county run school districts, county wide school districts, education, enrollment, executive county superintendent, home rule, independent schools, Local Education Authority (LEA), local schools, mandates, Maryland county run school districts model, New Jersey, Pennsylvania schools, property taxes, regional schools, regionalization of schools, school district consolidations, school district mergers, school finance, school funding, school governance, school law, school reform, small is beautiful, special education, state mandates | No Comments »

Smaller is Better when it comes to Running Our Schools

Thursday, January 29th, 2009

Since the publication of A Nation at Risk, there have been numerous efforts to try to find the right mixture of ways to improve student achievement while lowering the cost of education involving five major policy making levels (i.e., federal, state, district, school and classroom/student.) Many of these efforts have looked at the decision making process and how politics impacts that process in terms of the educational policies that result. Using test scores as a measure of student achievement and local property taxes as a measure of the cost of education, a number of states as well as the federal government have advocated through various means for larger class sizes as well as for school consolidations. Federal and many state governments have also advocated for the centralization of policy making at their respective levels as ways in which not only to improve student achievement but also to lower the cost of providing education.

These federal and state level stakeholders whose motto might conceivably be described as “bigger is better” seem to base their belief on presumed economies-of-scale that will lead to lower operating costs and thereby lower property taxes as well as to perhaps improving test scores through the application of nationally determined standards at the state level. One of their arguments seems to be based on the belief that having larger class sizes requires fewer teachers which in turn lowers operating costs. In addition, larger class sizes mean fewer class rooms would be used thereby minimizing the demand for new or expanded school facilities. Another argument advocates for school district consolidation as a way in which to achieve improved operating efficiency primarily through presumed lower administrative costs.

National standards such as those imposed by the No Child Left Behind Act (NCLB) with its mandated tests are also seen as a way in which to drive the formulation of educational policy at the federal and state levels while the federal level includes an aggregation of state data. Such national educational policy is believed to help “raise the bar” for student performance. While NCLB is mandated by the federal government, the states force their school districts to comply with its regulations. The NCLB test scores are used to determine adequate yearly progress (AYP) for students, schools and districts alike.

But the combination of federally-determined educational policy implemented through state governments and departments of education has often resulted in decisions seemingly made more in favor of special interest groups than local schools as well as in higher costs. Consolidating local school districts into countywide or extremely large regional districts removes decision making authority from those levels most affected by educational policy decisions: the individual student, school and district. It also concentrates policy formulation and decision making at centralized levels where special interests have greater leverage on the policy makers and, as a result, greater control of the policy outcomes. Moreover, consolidation of local school districts into county level districts while fewer in number with supposedly less combined administrative expense has often resulted in higher state-wide total administrative costs due to the lack of accountability, excessive political patronage hiring at the county level and reduced local taxpayer input.

Because the federal and state levels are too distant from where education actually takes place and are more easily influenced by special interest groups, accountability declines at these levels where it is needed most. Consolidation of local school districts into county level districts also tends to result in more of a traditional military-type command-and-control decision making model. In this Theory X model the federal level develops the strategy for policy implementation, the state governments and their departments of education translate the strategy into tactics for deployment, and the school districts are responsible for making sure that the federal and state mandates are implemented accordingly at the individual school and student level.

Because countywide or regional school district consolidations lead to increased education costs, lower student achievement especially as measured by test scores and less accountability such combinations should be prevented. Eliminating units of consolidation such as county level departments of education will not only remove an unnecessary layer of bureaucracy and cut administrative costs but also improve accountability particularly to local taxpayers as well as to parents. Moreover, without county level departments of education or large regionalized school districts overburdening our educational systems, our schools will be better able to provide quality instruction.

The majority of research on class size has demonstrated that when qualified teachers teach students in smaller class sizes, the students not only learn more but also these students retain this advantage over other students who attend larger classes. One leading study is the longitudinal class size reduction initiative conducted over a number of years in Tennessee called the Student Teacher Achievement Ratio (STAR) project. The STAR project demonstrated that students, who were enrolled in small classes beginning with kindergarten and continuing through third grade, were significantly more likely than their counterparts who attended larger classes, to:

Demonstrate better reading and mathematics skills
Complete more advanced mathematics, science and English courses
Complete high school
Graduate high school on time
Graduate with honors.

The STAR project also found that even after the students returned to larger classes in the fourth through eighth grades those students who attended smaller class sizes for their first three or four years maintained an advantage over students who had attended the larger classes from kindergarten through third grade. The findings of the STAR project are echoed by other projects such as Wisconsin’s Student Achievement Guarantee in Education (SAGE) project, which was a statewide initiative in Wisconsin that increased student achievement, and Indiana’s Project Prime Time. In addition, the research demonstrates that having a smaller class size not only increases student achievement but also helps to minimize the achievement gap among different groups of students particularly among majority and minority students.

“Smaller is better” and it should not be surprising that research supports this. Having fewer students in the classroom enables the teacher to dedicate more time to each child. Consequently, students pay more attention to class work and participate more in academics. Because the students are more involved with their studies they learn more and behave better. Is it any wonder then that test scores are significantly higher for students who attend small classes? Based upon the findings of the STAR project and other studies there seems to be little doubt that students taught in small classes enjoy significant and lasting educational advantages.

The greater is the shift to larger class sizes nationwide, the more teachers will probably be let go. However, larger class sizes often lead to lower test scores and make it more difficult for students, schools and districts to achieve adequate yearly progress (AYP) as required by NCLB. As a result, school districts are likely to be subjected to many of the more stringent penalties of NCLB. This will further reduce the financial resources available to support quality education and contribute to a downward spiral of education nationwide.

Concentrating decision making at the district level rather than at the county, state or federal level will increase accountability not only by focusing more resources on those most affected by education policy, the students, but also by enabling those who are the most intimately involved in providing education, the school districts, to provide improved instruction. It is the districts that not only are closest to the school systems and students but also have the necessary expertise to most effectively decide how best to provide a quality education.

But the greatest reduction of our state’s property tax burden would be to eliminate the unnecessary and overly expensive layer of county government (i.e., Freeholders) as the majority of states have already done. For example, Connecticut had a system similar to the one in New Jersey in which Connecticut not only had the Freeholder level of government but also had the counties involved in the running of local schools as New Jersey does through such legislation as A4S which created the Office of the Executive County Superintendent. Because those associated with both levels of county government, Freeholder government as well as the County Department of Education, were not only too far removed from local taxpayers but also too expensive, Connecticut’s solution to cutting property taxes while improving the resources available for education was to eliminate county government.

However, there is perhaps an even greater irony within debate over how best to improve student achievement while minimizing property taxes. The dilemma facing our schools is that while districts must comply with the requirements of unfunded and under funded county, state and federal mandates, too many school districts are forced to spend much more to meet these requirements than they receive in combined financial aid from all county, state and federal governmental sources.

Tags:A Nation at Risk, Annual Yearly Progress, AYP, class, class size, county government, economies of scale, educational policies, Freeholder government, lowering property taxes, NCLB, property taaxes, SAGE, school consolidations, standards, STAR, student achievement, student teacher ratios, test scores
Posted in class size, county government, education, executive county superintendent, home rule, IDEA, independent schools, mandates, New Jersey, No Child Left Behind Act, property taxes, ratables, SAGE, SAT, school finance, school funding, school governance, school law, school reform, special education, STAR, state mandates, student teacher ratios, tax base | No Comments »

Guest Viewpoint by Dr. Bruce Cooper: “Beyond Bricks and Mortar” edweek.org 1-21-09

Thursday, January 22nd, 2009

Published Online: January 21, 2009

Published in Print: January 21, 2009

Commentary

Beyond Bricks and Mortar

By Bruce S. Cooper

With a worsening U.S. economy, America’s schools face tough times ahead. Can new leadership in Washington succeed in linking steps devised to relieve our economic woes with measures to improve education policies—and, in the process, moderate the effects of the recession on our schools?

It would be a terrible mistake to let the schools become a casualty of this downturn. We know from the work of economists such as Theodore Schultz, Henry M. Levin, Martin Carnoy, and others that societal investments in education pay long-term dividends in higher earnings, more-productive economies, increased gross domestic product, and a better way of life. In flush times, it is easy and useful to invest more in schools and the children who attend them. Not so in this terrible economy, with reduced tax receipts and lower allocations to schools at all levels of government. What President Barack Obama advises will be critical.

Of course, public schools, as well as private ones, will have to tighten their belts, eliminate waste, and use money more frugally. They must trim bureaucracies and learn to provide more instruction and support for students with less funding. But they are too valuable to the nation’s well-being to be wrecked or weakened. Federal leadership will be essential in this area, not only in reducing the negative impact on schools, directing funding to where it matters most, and eliminating unnecessary and ineffective spending, but also in providing schools with models of best practices and most-effective uses of funds.

As a first step, Mr. Obama has proposed one simple yet elegant solution: Use part of a government-financed stimulus package to hire the growing number of unemployed workers, who can help build new, much-needed facilities and renovate older schools to better foster student learning. The idea, drawn from the Depression-era Works Progress Administration and the Public Works Administration, which built bridges, roads, and public buildings in the 1930s, is a good one. But there are also other ways to meld educational and economic improvement. Here are some suggestions:

• Merit pay, improved outcomes.

Paying teachers consumes about half the budgets of U.S. schools. We need to keep adequate funding for compensation available, and the ranks of teachers strong. But these allocations could be used to do more than simply pay all teachers at a general salary level. They could strategically target funding, providing more to the teachers of low-achieving students, those working in difficult schools, and teachers in understaffed subjects like physics and math and special education. More also could be given to teachers who make outstanding improvements in student learning.

“Merit pay” has always been a scary term to teachers’ unions, but President Obama could work to persuade teaching professionals that differentiated pay for differentiated responsibility and better performance in hard-to-staff settings and subjects is not a plot to destroy unions. It is a strategy for making dollars go further to benefit students and their communities.

• With less funding available, more directed to the classroom.

Another, more controversial step would be to reduce total school funding, as the economy requires, while maintaining as much spending in the classroom as possible. In 1988, Robert Sarrel, then the business manager of New York City high schools, Sheree Speakman, an analyst at Coopers & Lybrand, and I devised a system (later called In$ite) that accounted for the proportion of real resources that reached the classroom for face-to-face, direct instruction of children. When Mayor Rudolph W. Giuliani of New York later instituted use of the Finance Analysis Model, only 33 percent of school funds were found to be reaching the children for direct instruction. Today, the level under his successor, Mayor Michael R. Bloomberg, has reached 57 percent for direct teaching and learning (including, for example, teachers’ salaries and benefits, textbooks, computers, and other materials), and a full 90 percent has been spent in the schools themselves, rather than the central office, reducing waste, bureaucracy, and overhead.

America can expand and broaden this trend by directing more of the diminished resources for education directly to schools, reducing the central bureaucracy, and by making more of that money available at the classroom level for instruction. This strategy would enable schools to absorb the decline in revenue creatively and to the benefit of students.

• Managing increases in special education students and costs.

The chief new costs in the field are for special education, as nearly 14 percent of children are now classified as eligible, and more than a quarter of all costs at the district level are for serving these students (from special transportation and occupational, speech, and physical therapies, to double time, scribes to write for kids, one-to-one paraprofessionals, interpreters, and nurses). As the numbers and services go up, the expenses rise. It’s time to build better programs, ones that are more economical and more local, and that make use of existing facilities and resources.

• “Leveling down” to greater equity.

In better economic times, the states have sought to equalize spending across districts, using concepts of equity and, more recently, of adequacy. Now, with states having much less money at their disposal, equity may mean a “leveling down”: Richer districts may find their budgets significantly reduced by a combination of higher real estate taxes and diminished housing values, while poor urban districts could be in slightly better shape. These are times to look at the effects of tax revenues and property values—the key way that local school districts raise money. Equity may change meaning, and the new president should keep a close eye on these changes in school funding across states and between states.

In education, money matters more now than it has since the Great Depression. More children are entering school, and, with preschool and pre-preschool programs growing along with college-going rates, they are staying in school longer. We know that healing the economy will be President Obama’s top priority. But schools, which seemed in the long campaign season to have fallen steeply on the nation’s priority list, are always important. By thinking through the new finances of schools, we can help build, fix, staff, and improve them, even—perhaps particularly—in tough times like these. History has shown us that today’s financial support and operational improvements will pay economic dividends in the future.

Bruce S. Cooper is a professor of education leadership and policy at Fordham University, in New York City.

Vol. 28, Issue 18, Page 26

Tags:education, school finance, school funding formula, school governance
Posted in education, school finance, school funding, school governance, school reform, Uncategorized | No Comments »

Creating Self-Governing Independent Public Schools

Sunday, January 11th, 2009

Our public schools must be given the choice of becoming self-governing so that they can be free to provide a top quality educational system. A self-governing public school district is free of state control as well as federal intervention. Therefore, it would be independent of the state system but remain a public school district serving the same local community rather than a charter school or a private school or a school run in full or in part by a private company. While public school districts could elect to stay within the state system and continue to abide by all mandates, all districts should be given the opportunity to legally opt out. The ability to opt for self-governance would be supported by legislation.

Self-governance would provide public schools with the authority to improve education consistent with the priorities of their local school communities as well as the flexibility to innovate rather than be forced to march in lock-step to the state’s one size fits all mandates. Public schools choosing to opt out would be independent public schools free of all state mandates except for perhaps reporting test results but they would also forgo all state aid. Opting out of the state system would restore decision-making to the local school district level. Because decisions guiding the operations of self-governing schools would no longer be made largely at the county or state level, parents, teachers, school administrators, boards of education, and local taxpayers would be better able to shape the quality of education which their students receive in their local schools.

A public school district would become self-governing when a simple majority of the registered district voters who voted in a district-wide vote approved of the change. While these votes would comply with the laws governing ballot procedures, campaigns and elections, they would be held in April so as to provide sufficient lead time to convert to self-governance by July 1, the beginning of the new fiscal year. Once the district community voted to authorize the school district to become self-governing, it would be governed solely by its board of education. Board of education members would be chosen from among the registered voters in the school district. Municipal, county, state and federal governments would no longer play any role in the governance or management of self-governing school districts. Therefore, boards of school estimate would no longer have any role vis-à-vis appointed boards of education.

Local property tax levies rather than tuition would continue to be the primary source of funding for self-governing public school districts. Still, these districts would be eligible to receive appropriate state or federal grants. The annual operating budget and debt authorizations for a self-governing public school district would be decided by its board of education rather than be subject to district-wide public votes. Indeed, this would be consistent with the fact that the annual operating budgets of municipal, county, state and federal governments are not subject to approval through a vote of their respective electorates.

Becoming self-governing would enable a school district to operate more efficiently and cost-effectively through the exercise of many new choices. A self-governing school district would be free to choose whether to have unions. If it chooses to be union-free, it would be no longer subject to such legislative restrictions as the New Jersey Employer-Employee Relations Act which is commonly referred to as the “PERC law” (Strassman, Vogt and Wary, 1991.) If the district elected not to have unions, then all union contracts such as those with its teachers would be dissolved and renegotiated once the district became self-governing.

Free of outside governmental intrusion such as the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) Act, the district also would be free to determine its teacher licensing requirements including training, education and experience. Because the district would no longer be subject to the New Jersey Core Curriculum Content Standards (CCCS,) it would be free to develop and determine its own curriculum. The district also would be free to determine whether or not to offer special education because the Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act (IDEA) and state special education requirements would no longer apply. If the district chooses to provide special education, then it would have sole discretion over what level and kinds of special education it offered.

A self-governing public school district would be held harmless from frivolous lawsuits through its enabling legislation. This would help to greatly minimize escalating legal expenses. Law suits filed against the district would be heard first by one of several newly created arbitration panels. Arbitration panel members would be appointed by a newly created state-wide association of self-governing public school districts.

By changing to self-governance, a school district would be able to cut unnecessary expenses through the elimination of special education-based lawsuits with the ever increasing costs arising from such litigation. As parents have become more knowledgeable about what constitutes special education programs and services, they have increased their demands to have their children receive not only more intensive services as well as increasing their children’s classification but also more placements in private schools which have resulted in more parents suing school districts for these additional benefits. New Jersey’s legal system, however, operates according to a fee shifting principle in which a school district losing in an administrative court not only must pay all of the judgment costs but also all of the plaintiff’s legal costs including those for their attorneys and expert witnesses regardless of the length of the trial.

Litigation for special education proceedings often takes longer than civil law suits which increase legal fees and court costs. In addition, there is the cost resulting from the amount of time required of teachers, child study teams and administrators to appear in court rather than in school. While school districts do settle a number of cases rather than run the risk of potentially more expensive outcomes, these settlements fuel the cost of providing special education. Holding New Jersey school districts harmless from such law suits would be another way in which to enable school districts to allocate more of their scarce resources to student instruction.

The ever increasing cost of unfunded and under funded mandates is not only forcing school districts to cut regular education programs and, therefore, leveling down student achievement but also increasing property taxes. But New Jersey’s public school districts can no longer afford to pay for these unfunded and under funded mandates because most school districts are forced to spend disproportionately more to meet the requirements of these mandates than these districts receive in total state and federal financial aid. If local school districts opted for self-governance, therefore, they would eliminate the excessive financial and administrative burdens imposed by the county, state and federal governments.

Opting for self-governance would increase the financial resources available for the classroom because it would be much more cost effective for local school districts to provide educational programs and services without the administrative burden of state requirements. The funds that are currently used for regulatory compliance with state mandates could be redirected to improving student learning and achievement, which after all is the real mission of our schools. Changing our state’s educational system in this way would not only improve the quality of education but also increase property taxpayers’ return on investment. But Trenton continues to blame school districts for property tax increases rather than take responsibility for their role in keeping property taxes high. Instead of fully funding their mandates to reduce the property tax burden which drives up the cost of public education, Trenton focuses largely on constricting school district funding, budgets, operations and the independence of local school districts.

The state’s flawed approach is demonstrated in the new funding formula as contained in the New Jersey School Funding Reform Act (SFRA) of 2008 as well as its predecessor the Comprehensive Education Improvement and Financing Act of 1996 (CEIFA,) which caused higher property taxes and cuts in regular education. Dr. Reock, Rutgers University Professor Emeritus, studied the financial impact on school districts of the state’s failure not only to not fully enact CEIFA but also to freeze most CEIFA funding beginning with the 2002-03 school year and reached a profound conclusion (Reock, 2007.)

Based on his study (Sciarra, 2008), Dr. Reock found that “the state aid freeze caused massive under-funding of many school districts throughout the state, especially poor non-Abbott districts, and contributed to the property tax problem in the state.” Instead of fully funding the CEIFA school funding formula as required by law, the state froze financial aid to schools at their 2001-02 school year levels regardless of any increases in enrollment, rising costs as well as state and federal unfunded mandates. The shortfall was hardest on those districts that were most dependent upon state aid. During the 2005-06 school year the statewide shortfall amounted to $846 million which translated into per pupil shortfalls of $1,627 in non-Abbott DFG A and B districts, $758 in DFG C through H districts, $386 DFG I and J districts, and $188 in Abbott districts.

The impact of the CEIFA funding shortfall was minimized on the Abbott districts largely due to their “parity-plus” court mandated protection. State law forbids the budget of an Abbott district from falling below its level of the prior school year (Hu, 2006.) Furthermore, under state law, if an Abbott district increases local property taxes without a state directive to do so, it will lose a similar amount of state aid.

The CEIFA funding shortfall also caused serious imbalances between local school districts. During the 2005-06 school year Abbott districts received approximately 58% of all state financial aid while educating only 23% of New Jersey’s K to 12 student enrollment. This meant non-Abbott districts were educating 77% of New Jersey’s students with only 42% of state aid. This imbalance has continued to widen under SFRA with Abbott aid increasing to approximately 60% of all state aid or $4.64 billion. State aid reductions and the ever increasing unfunded state mandates force non-Abbott districts to balance their budgets by raising property taxes, increasing class sizes as well as cutting regular education programs and services.

As part of his statement of New Jersey Supreme Court certification in support of the Plaintiffs’ opposition to the School Funding Reform Act (SFRA) of 2008, Dr. Reock concluded (Sciarra, 2008) that “the State’s failure to fund CEIFA for the past six years directly resulted in an enormous shortfall of funding in districts across New Jersey.” He went further to state, “By 2007-08, the sixth year of the CEIFA “freeze,” the total under-funding of state aid had reached $1.326 billion annually, despite the introduction of several new, smaller aid programs.” The result was a state-driven increase in local property taxes within non-Abbott districts to make up for the shortfall.

Creating state-wide self-governing public school districts free of state control is the solution that will lead to a top quality, cost-effective educational system while Trenton continues to force local school districts to pay for its under-funded and unfunded mandates that unnecessarily increase the cost of providing education and drive up property taxes. By forcing school districts to divert necessary resources to paying for the escalating costs of the State of New Jersey’s mandates rather than investing these scarce resources in the classroom where they are needed most, the State of New Jersey harms the quality of education. Local school districts, therefore, would be able to operate more cost-effectively with lower property taxes and earn a higher rate of return on their educational investment if they became self-governing by opting out of the state system.

_______________________________

References

Hu, W., (2008) In New Jersey, System to help Poorest Schools Faces Criticism, New York Times, October 30, 2006.

Reock, E. C. Jr., (2007) Paper, Estimated Financial Impact of the ‘Freeze’ of State Aid on New Jersey School Districts, 2002-03 to 2005-06,” Institute on Education Law and Policy, Rutgers University, Newark, http:// ielp.rutgers.edu/docs/CEIFA_Reock_Final.pdf

Sciarra, D. G., (2008) Certification of Dr. Ernest C. Reock, Jr. for the Supreme Court of New Jersey in support of the Plaintiffs’ opposition to the School Funding Reform Act of 2008, Education Law Center, Newark New Jersey, http://www.edlawcenter.org/ELCPublic/elcnews_080521_ReockCertification.pdf

Strassman, E. R., Vogt, K. R., and Wary, C. S., (1991). The Public Employment Relations Law, Trenton, New Jersey: New Jersey School Boards Association.

Tags:county government, education, education mandates, executive county superintendent, home rule, IDEA, independent public schools, local school district, municipal government, NCLB, neighborhood schools, New Jersey, No Child Left Behind Act, property taxes, public school, scapegoating our schools, school consolidation, school finance, school funding formula, school governance, school mergers, school reform, special education, state a, state aid, state education restrictions, state mandates, tax base, Trenton
Posted in assessment of property, county government, education, executive county superintendent, home rule, IDEA, independent schools, mandates, New Jersey, No Child Left Behind Act, property taxes, S1701, school finance, school funding, school governance, school law, school reform, special education, state mandates, tax base | 1 Comment »

Sauce for the “Goose” Should be Sauce for the “Gander”

Wednesday, December 31st, 2008

Sauce for the “Goose” Should be Sauce for the “Gander”

When Trenton is Cooking Property Tax Legislation

Shouldn’t the sauce for goose be the same sauce for gander especially when Trenton is cooking legislation to reduce property taxes? But if Trenton is truly intent upon lowering property taxes, then why does it continue to impose one set of rules for our schools while ignoring if not condoning those actions it opposes when they are performed by local and county governments? Is it because the county political bosses of both parties have undue influence over who runs for office, how campaigns are financed, and, therefore, who gets elected as well as legislation once the politicians are in office? Trenton scapegoats our schools through this hypocritical treatment. The result is disproportionately higher municipal and county property taxes.

Among the many ways the Governor and the State Legislature help to increase property taxes include ignoring municipal golden parachutes, forcing school district rather than municipal mergers, exempting local as well as county governments from S1701’s two percent surplus cap, and creating another layer of bureaucracy called the office of the Executive County Superintendent rather than eliminating county government. Through its actions, Trenton enables municipal and county property taxes to increase disproportionately by allowing these levels of government to continue unnecessary spending.

A recent example of Trenton’s apparent hypocritical treatment of our schools vis-à-vis municipal government is contained in an article written by Ms. Clark (2008) for The Jersey Journal which focuses on the payment of an $350,000 municipal golden parachute at local property taxpayers’ expense. Hoboken‘s former police chief, Mr. Carmen LaBruno, retired on July 1, 2008, and received an $350,000 golden parachute from the city. Mr. LaBruno’s golden parachute was (Clark, 2008) “in addition to his annual pension payment of $147,000” and included “terminal leave pay of five days per year for each of his 37 years with the department, and 156 days of unused vacation and compensatory time.” Taxpayers, therefore, paid Mr. LaBruno $497,000 for his first year of retirement.

However, as an Abbott district, Hoboken’s schools are funded primarily by the State of New Jersey. Hoboken is one of the 31 school districts which the New Jersey Supreme Court ruled in its Abbott v. Burke decision that could not properly provide a thorough and efficient education while funding their schools through their local property taxes. This means that the City of Hoboken’s payment of a golden parachute was essentially subsidized by taxpayers statewide.

The deafening silence with which Governor Corzine, Education Commissioner Davy, and the New Jersey State Legislature have greeted Hoboken’s granting of an $350,000 municipal golden parachute stands in stark contrast to their vociferous attacks on similar retirement packages for school officials just a few months ago. It was their combined outrage at payouts to retiring school officials such as the one given former Keansburg superintendent, Mrs. Barbara Trzeszkowski, who retired on July 1, 2008, that led Department of Education Commissioner Lucille Davy to issue new fiscal accountability regulations on July 3, 2008. These regulations severely limited payments to school officials for unused sick days and vacation time. In addition, the State Senate quickly passed bills to limit severance payments to school district officials (Hester, 2008) “to maximum of $15,000 for unused sick days and accrued vacation time.”

Through its newly created bureaucracy of the office of the Executive County Superintendent, the State of New Jersey can force the mergers of school districts but the state seems to ignore consolidating inefficient municipal governments which leads to higher property taxes. While municipal services are generic in that a city clerk’s function in one town replicates that of one in another town and as such these positions are easily consolidated, local educational programs and services are value-added which do not lend themselves to standardization or consolidation with other school districts with different value propositions. One major result of forced school district consolidations is that one or more of the districts involved usually pays disproportionately more in property taxes due to differences in one or more of the following factors:

The tax base (i.e., total ratables) which is the dollar amount of all property that is taxable within the jurisdiction.
The assessment practices that determine the percent of fair market value at which the property is assessed as well as the frequency of assessments. Although all 21 counties have agreed to use 100% as the assessment percentage of true value, many municipalities especially many large urban cities have not assessed properties within their jurisdiction for as much as 25 to 50 years.
The tax levy or mill rate which is the percentage at which each property’s market value or of assessed value is taxed.

The forced consolidation of Pemberton Borough and Pemberton Township school districts by the Burlington County Executive County Superintendent (Levinsky and Zimmaro, 2008) highlights the problems resulting from school district mergers. This consolidation would force taxes to decrease for Pemberton Borough property owners but increase for Pemberton Township property owners because the township has disproportionately more ratables. As a result of the merger, township taxpayers would fund approximately 95% of the property taxes for the consolidated school district and significantly subsidize the borough taxpayers. The State of New Jersey, however, has taken no action to merge the municipal governments of Pemberton Borough and Pemberton Township.

The state law known as S1701 reflects the State of New Jersey’s actions to scapegoat our schools for property tax issues. Through S1701, Trenton placed a two percent cap on the surplus of school budgets and mandated that any amount exceeding two percent must be returned to taxpayers. But the state exempted municipal and county governments! For example, in 2007 if S1701 had applied to municipal and county governments, then the City of Summit would have had to refund approximately $5.8 million to Summit property taxpayers while it is estimated that Union County would have had to refund tens of millions of dollars. Moreover, because Summit collectively pays disproportionately more property taxes to Union County than other municipalities, the taxpayers of Summit would have enjoyed a similarly large county property tax refund.

Connecticut is only one among the many states that has eliminated county government and thereby its citizens enjoy significantly lower property taxes than those of us in New Jersey. Why doesn’t Trenton eliminate the unnecessary and expensive county freeholder layer of government as other states have done? Is it because of the strangle-grip hold with which county political bosses control Trenton? Instead the State of New Jersey added the politically appointed Executive County Superintendent with his/her own bureaucracy. Executive County Superintendents have dramatically increased not only county level authority over local school districts but also the rules and regulations for schools. But with increased rules and regulations has come greatly increased compliance costs for school districts.

If property taxes are to be significantly reduced, the State of New Jersey must eliminate not only the unnecessary costs which its legislation imposes on local school districts but also excessive municipal government spending and county government. But New Jersey’s property taxes will remain high as long as the state continues to allow inefficient municipal governments and the unnecessary layer of county freeholder government to operate. Because the State of New Jersey forces its school districts to spend much more to meet the requirements of its mandates than the districts receive in total state financial aid, school districts statewide will continue to be pressured to cut quality educational programs and services. Moreover, the state’s obsession with scapegoating our schools underscores its failure to reduce property taxes at the municipal and county levels of government.

_______________

References

Clark, A. S., (2008) Ex-chief LaBruno collects $350K after retiring in wake of scandal, Jersey Journal, October 13, 2008.

Hester, T., (2008) Lawmakers pass bills regulating public educators’ pay, The Star Ledger, October 23, 2008.

Levinsky, D. and Zimmaro, M., (2008) Merger in Works for Pemberton district, Burlington County Times, September 7, 2008.

Tags:county government, executive county superintendent, municipal government, property taxes, ratables, S1701, scapegoating our schools, tax base
Posted in assessment of property, county government, executive county superintendent, mandates, New Jersey, ratables, school finance, school funding, school governance, school law, school reform, state mandates, tax base | No Comments »

Coffins Education Center

Archive for the ‘school finance’ Category

Self-governance

The Tieboutian Choice

The Capitalization of Local School District Quality

The Property Tax Burden of County Government in New Jersey

The Charter School Advantage: Operating as a Deregulated Autonomous Public School

Local School Districts mean Better Education

Smaller is Better when it comes to Running Our Schools

Guest Viewpoint by Dr. Bruce Cooper: “Beyond Bricks and Mortar” edweek.org 1-21-09

Beyond Bricks and Mortar

Creating Self-Governing Independent Public Schools

Sauce for the “Goose” Should be Sauce for the “Gander”

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